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Why Altruism Is Impossible 
... and Ubiquitous 
Barry Schwartz 
Swarthmore College 
Deeply held commitments to individualism, atomism, and egoism have moved psy- 
chology to underestimate the frequency and significance of altruism and to seek 
explanations of examples of altruism that are based in the self-interested motives 
of the altruists. In this article, I review evidence that altruism is pervasive and discuss 
the conditions that promote its development in children and its display in adults. 
However, I suggest that there is nothing natural or inevitable about the pervasiveness 
of altruism-that large-scale cultural influences that regulate social relations and 
contribute to establishing the boundaries between self and other can have profound 
effects on altruism. The contemporary United States, with its emphasis on market 
relations between free and autonomous individuals, exemplifies the cultural condi- 
tions least conducive to altruism. 
Historically, psychology has been guided by several theoretical pre- 
sumptions that are so deep and pervasive that they are rarely noticed. 
These presumptions can be identified as methodological individualism, 
psychological atomism, egoism, and naturalism. Together, these pre- 
sumptions imply that the proper unit for scientific analysis is the 
individual (methodological individualism), that the boundaries be- 
tween different individuals are clear and distinct (psychological atom- 
ism), that individuals are interested primarily, if not exclusively, in 
themselves (egoism), and that all of this is "natural," is nature's way. 
Although psychology is certainly not unique among the human sci- 
ences in these presumptions, there is virtually no major area of psy- 
chology that is untouched by them.' These presumptions figure promi- 
nently when psychologists confront the phenomenon of altruism. The 
apparent fact that people will (sometimes, often, occasionally) act to 
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Altruism and Psychology 315 
serve the interests of others, even at substantial cost to themselves, 
becomes a puzzle that demands investigation and explanation. The 
very definition of altruism ("devotion to the interests of others; op- 
posed to egoism," as one dictionary has it) depends on these theoretical 
presumptions. If people were not psychological atoms, dedicated to 
their own interests-if the boundaries between self and other were 
not clear and distinct-altruism as a distinct phenomenon might not 
even exist. But because of these presumptions, it does exist and so 
must be explained. 
Or better, it must be explained away. In biology, it may be explained 
away by means of the "selfish gene" and the concepts of kin selection, 
inclusive fitness, and reciprocal altruism that accompany selfish-gene 
theory.2 In economics, it may be explained away by the tautological 
notion of "preference maximization," which assumes that all choices 
maximize the preferences of the individuals who make them so that 
"it is ordinarily both convenient and reasonable for economics to ... 
treat the individual as satisfying his preferences without dealing explic- 
itly with the possibility that his preferences include a taste for helping 
other people."3 In psychology, it may be explained away by appeal to 
similarly tautological notions such as mutual reinforcement. In all such 
cases, the operating principle is that for altruism to occur, there simply 
must be something in it for the altruist and, further, that something 
must be not merely an incidental byproduct of the altruistic act but 
its cause. Said another way, it is not good enough to claim that when 
individuals engage in altruistic acts, they also produce benefits for 
themselves. Instead, the claim must be that when people behave altru- 
istically, it is because of the personal benefits derived from these acts. 
In the oft-quoted words of Michael Ghiselin, "Scratch an altruist and 
watch a hypocrite bleed."4 
The net result of these views in the various human sciences is to 
make the presumption of egoism virtually unfalsifiable. Empirical evi- 
dence to document claims of egoism is rarely required. Reinterpreta- 
tions of apparently altruistic acts in terms of their "real" egoistic causes 
are generated without constraint and accepted without careful scru- 
tiny. Coupled with a more general cultural attitude that identifies cyni- 
cism with realism and sophistication, this orientation of the human 
sciences virtually guarantees that acts of altruism will not be accepted 
on their face.5 Explanation of any social phenomenon that stops at 
altruism without unpacking the egoistic motives underlying it will be 
regarded as incomplete at best. 
Within psychology, research on altruism is usually consistent with 
the theoretical presumptions I have identified. When examples of 
apparent altruism (e.g., children helping one another in play settings, 
adults coming to the aid of a stranger in distress) are subjected to 
research scrutiny, one of a handful of strategies is usually employed. 
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Perhaps researchers attempt to uncover the "actual" selfish motives 
that the altruistic acts serve. Failing that, they attempt to uncover some 
mechanism (socialization, Freudian defense) that underlies it because 
it could not be the result, say, of rational deliberation on the part of 
the actor. Failing that, this act may be accepted on its face, but regarded 
as developmentally primitive, something immature that the actors will 
outgrow.6 Finally, failing that, the very concept of altruism in general 
may be subjected to an analysis in terms of some self-interested concept 
like reinforcement.7 
As a result of these strategies for explaining away altruism, a signifi- 
cant phenomenon is submerged. And as the presumptions and theo- 
ries from the human sciences become the intellectual currency of the 
culture at large, little effort is made to appeal to altruistic motives or 
social concerns in efforts to get people to do the right thing in their 
day-to-day life. Instead, appeals are made that show how one or an- 
other seemingly altruistic act will serve the long-term interests of the 
actors. Appeals are made for social support for prenatal care for poor 
women not because it is right, but because it will cost less than later 
intensive medical care for their infants. Appeals are made to combat 
child and wife abuse not because they are evil, but because domestic 
abuse costs employers millions of dollars in absenteeism and lowered 
job productivity. Appeals are made to improve urban education not 
because everyone in a society like ours should be literate, but because 
illiteracy costs all of us in welfare payments, unemployment benefits, 
and high crime rates.8 When appeals to self-interest are believed to 
be the only appeals that have any legitimacy, people begin to evaluate 
their own options and possibilities from within an egoistic calculus. 
The result is that the calculus of self-interest becomes self-fulfilling. 
As Jerome Kagan has said, "So many people have come to accept the 
truth of that assumption [of self-interest as the only interest] that the 
average person now treats it as a natural law."9 
I intend to challenge some of these presumptions by taking altruism 
seriously. I will review briefly the empirical research and theoretical 
claims of others who take altruism seriously, and I will outline what 
is known about the social conditions that seem to promote altruism. 
In the course of this article, it should become apparent that under a 
different set of presumptions-presumptions that challenge individu- 
alism, atomism, and egoism-altruism becomes not impossible but 
ubiquitous. 
Examples of Altruism 
The phenomena that provoke discussions of altruism range from the 
dramatic to the mundane. In the former category are examples of 
people who put themselves in great physical danger to assist others, 
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whether to save them from drowning or to pull them from a burning 
building. One recent account of such dramatic altruists is Samuel 
Oliner and Pearl Oliner's discussion of people who helped hide and 
save Jews during the Nazi holocaust.10 A striking finding is that these 
life-saving altruists typically did not think they were doing anything 
unusual or heroic; they were doing what anyone would do. Also in 
the "dramatic" category is a voluminous line of research provoked by 
a failure of altruism. This research, on bystander intervention and 
bystander apathy, was begun as a result of a well-publicized incident 
in New York in which a woman was beaten to death as dozens of 
neighbors looked on from their apartment windows. Bibb Latane and 
John Darley, among others, attempted to bring this phenomenon into 
the laboratory to determine the variables that affect the likelihood of 
intervention." They found that the likelihood of intervention de- 
creases as the number of people who might intervene increases, as 
the physical proximity of the victim decreases, as the anonymity of 
the observers increases, as the familiarity of the victim decreases, and 
as the similarity of the victim to the observer decreases. People 
are much more likely to help in small towns than in big cities, 
they are much more likely to help people they know than strangers, 
they are much more likely to help people who are like them (in race, 
class, ethnicity) than people who are not, and they are much more 
likely to help if they are the only ones around. What is sometimes lost 
in all this analytical detail, however, is that most of the time, people 
do help. For example, in one series of studies that investigated the 
likelihood that young children and adolescents would come to the aid 
of an injured victim, fully 80 percent of subjects provided help.12 So 
although people do not always help, they usually do. 
In the category of more mundane acts of altruism are instances of 
giving to charity. Survey data indicate that more than 90 percent of 
Americans give to charity (more than 20 million American families 
give 5% or more of their incomes), and almost 50 percent do some 
kind of volunteer work."13 In what may be the classic study of giving, 
Richard Titmuss surveyed 4,000 blood donors in England and found 
that only a small percentage of the donors expected to get any- 
thing--either directly or indirectly-in return. The language they 
used to explain their behavior was a moral language emphasizing 
responsibility and obligation rather than interest or egoism. Titmuss 
also observed that in nations like the United States, where "donors" 
could sell their blood rather than giving it, the language of interest 
came to replace the language of responsibility.14 
In addition to these examples of altruism, there are many examples 
of related phenomena-of sharing resources and cooperating on proj- 
ects when neither is required by the situation, indeed even when the 
situation mitigates against cooperation or sharing. A classic example 
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of a situation that pits cooperation against self-interest is found in 
game theory, specifically in what is called the Prisoner's Dilemma. In 
a classic Prisoner's Dilemma, each of two players may choose either 
to cooperate or to defect, and points are awarded to each based on 
his or her choices. Each player will do best if he or she defects and 
the other cooperates, and both players will do better if they both 
cooperate than if they both defect. The logic of the game dictates that 
unless the game has multiple turns, so that players can retaliate for 
defections, the only rational move for either player is defection. The 
result is that both players end up worse off than they would if they 
had cooperated. 
In a game with multiple turns, however, cooperation can emerge 
as the dominant (i.e., most successful) strategy. Studies of the Pris- 
oner's Dilemma have been used by Robert Axelrod and others to 
suggest the structural conditions necessary (principally, the possibil- 
ity of retaliation for noncooperation) for cooperation to emerge 
among self-interested individuals.'5 However, recent research shows 
that many of these conditions are actually unnecessary. In Prisoner's 
Dilemma-like situations, subjects cooperated even when the games 
involved only one turn and their own choices were made anony- 
mously. They cooperated even when cooperation could gain them 
nothing and could cost them substantially. The critical determinant 
of whether cooperation occurred was whether the people playing 
the game had an opportunity to communicate with one another 
prior to making their choices. Even brief group discussion was suffi- 
cient to engender in most subjects enough group identification and 
group solidarity that they felt bound to choose with group, not 
individual, interests in mind.16 What this recent finding suggests is 
that Prisoner's Dilemma defections will reliably occur only when 
participants in a game are deprived of any opportunity to form 
any social bond. The presumptions of individualism, atomism, and 
egoism may have blinded previous investigators to the powerful 
effects of social solidarity and led to experiments conducted in a 
context in which solidarity could not possibly form. It appears that 
if solidarity can form, it will, and the logic of self-interest will be 
submerged as a result. 
Much of the research that has been done on cooperation and sharing 
has been done with children in school settings. Although results tend 
to vary with age, children do a substantial amount of spontaneous 
cooperating and sharing, and it is not very difficult to induce children 
to cooperate and share still more.17 Because the typical classroom is 
not set up to encourage cooperation (children are required to work 
independently, social interaction among students is regarded as disrup- 
tive behavior, and teachers often use competitive incentives), it is all 
the more remarkable that it appears. 
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Studies of cooperation, of sharing, and of helping even among pre- 
school children, done both in the laboratory and in the home, demon- 
strate high frequencies of cooperation and sharing. In one such study, 
children between the ages of 3 and 7 were observed in play situations 
in which opportunities to help, comfort, or share with another child 
were possible. In the laboratory, more than half of the children studied 
displayed at least one of these prosocial behaviors during a 40-minute 
observation period. During a similar observation period in the home, 
almost 90 percent of the children acted selflessly.'8 Several other stud- 
ies have produced similar results.'9 
Taken together, these phenomena, and many others like them, make 
it clear that altruistic behavior, whether dramatic or mundane, is not the 
least bit unusual. Helping, comforting, sharing, and cooperating occur 
among children and adults. They occur in school and in the home. 
They occur among acquaintances and among strangers. Although such 
behavior does not always occur, it occurs sufficiently frequently, in suffi- 
ciently diverse settings, that to deny the existence of genuine altruism 
requires extraordinary acts of creative interpretation. 
With all these diverse examples, I have yet to mention the class of 
altruistic behavior that is most pervasive-the behavior that occurs 
among members of a family. The subdiscipline of evolutionary biology 
known as sociobiology was essentially created to explain how these 
blatant and ubiquitous acts of self-sacrifice among family members 
can be reconciled with a general theory (natural selection) whose logic 
seems to demand selfishness.20 Selfish genes, inclusive fitness, and kin 
selection are all postulated to show that deep down, self-sacrifice is 
really selfish. Sociobiology has been subject to substantial scrutiny and 
criticism, especially when it is applied to human behavior, but this is 
not the place to rehearse the arguments." Leaving debates about 
sociobiology aside, if altruism is understood to mean "devotion to the 
interests of others," one glance at the behavior of families should 
convince us that it is everywhere. 
Variables Affecting Altruism 
Given that altruism does indeed occur, what can be said about the 
variables that influence its occurrence? Research on this topic has 
looked both at the individual and at the social context. It has explored 
whether altruism might be related to traits of character or personality 
and how it is affected by transient emotional or motivational states. It 
has examined in detail the socialization process for factors in the pro- 
cess of social development that might promote altruism. The literature 
is too voluminous to review here.22 Thus, my discussion will be cursory, 
with an emphasis in the next section on what research in social develop- 
ment suggests are the necessary ingredients of altruism and the social- 
ization experiences that promote it. 
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One variable that seems positively related to altruism and other 
forms of prosocial behavior is self-esteem. Although the literature is 
equivocal, most research has found that people-adults and chil- 
dren-with a positive self-concept are more likely to be helpful than 
people whose self-esteem is weak.23 If one is sure of oneself, it seems 
easier to extend oneself to others. However, there are exceptions to 
this generalization. People with an extremely high opinion of them- 
selves may feel no need to be connected to others, and people with a 
low opinion of themselves may be helpful just to garner social ap- 
proval.24 Thus, it seems thatjust the right amount of self-esteem (what- 
ever that might be) promotes altruism. 
Still less clear is the relation of gender to altruism. In recent years, 
research on moral reasoning has led to the view that whereas men 
tend to be guided in their reasoning by an ethic of "rights," women 
tend to be guided by an ethic of "care, connection, and responsibility."25 
This difference in the criteria used for making moral judgments might 
lead one to suspect that women are more likely to be altruistic than 
men. However, research does not bear this expectation out. There 
are some studies in which women are more likely to help than men, 
but there are also studies in which the reverse is true, and there are 
many studies in which there seems to be no effect of gender.26 And 
importantly, in one study of preschoolers, children who are presum- 
ably too young to have strongly developed gender roles, there were 
no observable gender differences in either helping, sharing, or moral 
reasoning.27 
Two other variables that may be related to altruism are political and 
religious affiliation. In the political domain, there is some evidence 
that liberals score higher than conservatives on tests of moral reason- 
ing, and that conservatives are more likely than liberals to hold the 
'just-world" view that people basically get what is coming to them.28 
These findings suggest potential differences in altruistic behavior, but 
I know of no studies that have found such differences. In the case of 
religion, many studies completed over the last 25 years have failed to 
find any relation between degree of religious conviction and a wide 
range of different kinds of altruistic activity.29 One recent study, how- 
ever, suggests that failures to find a relation between religious convic- 
tion and altruism may stem from measures of religious conviction 
that are too crude. Daniel Batson and colleagues distinguished among 
religious people those who see religion as a means to extrinsic ends, 
those who see it as an end in itself, and those who see it as a quest. 
Only among people in the latter group was helping positively related 
to religiosity.s0 Thus, if the relation between religious conviction and 
altruism is to be explored further, care must be taken to measure 
not only how religious individuals are, but what the content of their 
religious commitments is. 
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The only clear picture that emerges from the discussion thus far is 
that there is no clear picture. However, one variable that does seem 
to figure prominently in the degree of altruism people display is the 
extent to which potential altruists identify with the individuals or the 
group they will be helping. People are more inclined to help those who 
are perceived as similar to themselves than those who are perceived as 
different.31 They are more likely to help members of their own racial 
or ethnic group than members of different groups.32 Even when 
"groups" are established in the laboratory by means of a few minutes 
of discussion, the amount of group-serving, cooperative behavior is 
enhanced.33 The anecdotal observation, confirmed by some empirical 
research, that people who live in small towns or rural settings are 
more likely to help than those who live in cities may in part be the 
result of group identification that small-town life makes possible and 
urban life prevents.34 Altruistic acts that depend on group identifica- 
tion are susceptible to interpretations that suggest they are ultimately 
egoistic and self-interested, either by engendering future reciprocation 
(reciprocal altruism) or by deriving some benefits to one's social stand- 
ing. Although there are several studies that have tried with some 
success to rule these "ultimate self-interest" interpretations out, 
there seems to be an endless supply of new possibilities waiting in the 
wings to replace self-interest hypotheses that have been empirically 
eliminated."s5 
Altruism and Socialization 
Whenever a claim is made that some characteristic or other is "human 
nature," attempts to evaluate the claim turn almost immediately to 
development. In light of the troika of presumptions about human 
nature with which I began this article-individualism, atomism, and 
egoism-researchers have paid a great deal of attention to the develop- 
ment of social behavior. If egoism is human nature, and positive social 
activity is a result of socialization, then we should expect to find that 
positive social behavior increases with development. If, however, there 
is something "natural" about positive social behavior, then we should 
see signs of it very early on. Although studies of development that 
have attempted to resolve this issue have been inconclusive, they have 
suggested what some of the requisite components of positive social 
behavior are, and what kinds of developmental experience seem to 
foster those components.36 
In an influential account of the development of altruism, Martin 
Hoffman suggests that altruism has two requirements, one affective 
and one cognitive."7 Genuine altruism requires empathy (affective) 
and perspective taking (cognitive). One's distress at the distress of 
another can be direct and immediate. It is painful, for example, to 
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hear infants cry-even for other infants.38 However, this empathy 
may not lead to altruism. Indeed, it may lead to escape if the affect is 
intense enough. For empathy to lead to altruism, it must be combined 
with perspective taking. To be able to feel what another is feeling 
(empathy) requires substantial understanding (perspective taking) of 
what the other is experiencing. Hoffman refers to this kind of affect 
combined with perspective taking as sympathy. According to Hoff- 
man, children move from empathy to sympathy in stages as their 
cognitive sophistication increases.39 
Although both empathy and perspective taking are necessary for 
altruism, neither is sufficient. One can experience intense distress at 
the distress of another, but without an accompanying understanding 
of the source and nature of the distress, one might act only to relieve 
the distress in oneself (e.g., by escaping) or act to try to relieve the 
distress of the other in a way that is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, 
one can have a thorough understanding of the perspective of the other 
but use this only to serve one's own interests (e.g., by avoiding a similar 
situation oneself). To behave altruistically, one must both understand 
what the other is experiencing and want to do something about it. 
As I indicated above, research on altruism in children, both in labo- 
ratory settings and in the home, suggests that it is abundant.40 Most 
18-month-olds will share something with another person, and most 
children between 18 and 24 months will respond positively to another's 
distress. Thus, even before much of the requisite cognitive develop- 
ment has occurred, instances of altruism are common. However, there 
are also individual differences among children in altruism, and at 
least some evidence suggests that the different responses to others in 
distress when children are quite young can predict how these children 
will respond as much as 5 years later.41 The existence of individual 
differences, together with the suggestion that early differences may 
be perpetuated, prompts one to investigate the socialization variables 
that may enhance or retard altruistic behavior. 
The first place to look for socialization effects is at the relations 
between parents and children. Hoffman identified several child-rear- 
ing variables that affect the degree of altruism displayed by children.42 
First, parents can enhance altruism by engaging in altruistic behavior 
themselves. Second, parents can enhance altruism by using certain 
disciplinary techniques when their children are responsible for an- 
other's distress. By using what Hoffman calls "inductive," as opposed 
to punitive, discipline, a parent can turn a child's transgressions to 
good effect. Inductive discipline stresses the effects of the child's be- 
havior on others, emphasizing long-range, perhaps unforeseen, ef- 
fects, both psychological and physical, and steps that may be taken to 
ameliorate the consequences of the child's transgression. Such disci- 
plinary techniques possess moral content; that is, the parent makes 
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clear that the child's actions not only had unfortunate effects, but that 
they were wrong. The constructive and reparative character of the 
induction seems to result in the child's internalization of the appro- 
priate moral norm, making similar transgressions less likely in the 
future and spontaneous reparations more likely, should transgressions 
occur. In contrast with inductive discipline, discipline based on creat- 
ing fear of future punishment, or discipline based on the assertion of 
parental power or on the direct withdrawal of parental love do not 
have salutary effects on the likelihood of future altruistic behavior. 
On Hoffman's account, inductive discipline succeeds in promoting 
altruism where other techniques fail because by emphasizing the plight 
of the victim the parent triggers empathic distress in the child. Other 
disciplinary techniques may also trigger distress, but the distress will 
be focused on the (future) plight of the self rather than on the victim. 
There is also some reason to believe that inductive discipline may 
promote altruism by encouraging children to reason about the moral 
significance of their actions, something that even young children seem 
able and willing to do.43 
In addition to using inductive discipline, parents can promote altru- 
ism by providing whatever discipline they provide in a context of 
substantial parental affection. Persistent and abundant parental af- 
fection can reduce the child's focus or preoccupation with his or her 
own emotional needs, thus making it easier for sympathy and perspec- 
tive taking to occur. 
Although the home is certainly the central domain for socialization 
in childhood, it is not the only one. Much socialization occurs in the 
classroom. Cooperative learning and play settings in the classroom 
seem to enhance children's perspective-taking abilities.44 They also 
seem to enhance self-esteem, which, as noted earlier, contributes to 
prosocial behavior.45 Children with substantial experience cooperating 
in the classroom are more likely than other children to help others or 
to donate some of their resources to others."46 Conversely, explicitly 
competitive classroom situations seem to reduce all of these prosocial 
effects.47 There is also some evidence that in addition to providing 
opportunities for cooperation, schools can facilitate altruism by put- 
ting children into mixed-age groups."48 Because children of different 
ages are expected to perform at different levels, mixing age groups 
discourages implicit competition. It also gives older children practice 
in perspective taking as they try to help the younger ones. 
Friendship also positively influences prosocial behavior." Studies of 
play in children from as young as 12 months to as old as 10 years 
indicate that turn taking and sharing are the rule. Despite the old 
Piagetian lore to the contrary, when young children speak as they 
play, the majority of their speech is social, not egocentric. The speech 
of each child is coordinated with the group'sjoint activities. As children 
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get older (ages 6-7), friendships seem to be defined by strict reciproc- 
ity, but by the time they reach age 9 or 10, reciprocity is replaced by 
a richer understanding of mutual commitment and obligation in which 
children acknowledge a principle much like "from each according to 
his abilities and to each according to his needs." The friendship be- 
comes a unit that is different from (more than) the individual needs 
and wants of the participants. At this age, children seem to realize 
that friendships take work and long-term commitment. The children 
seem no longer to see themselves (if they ever did) as the psychological 
atoms that most psychological theories presume. 
None of these findings should come as much of a surprise. Millennia 
ago, in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle observed that it is hard to be 
good-that being good takes practice. This practice occurs in the 
routine activities of daily life. If daily life is properly structured, being 
good becomes automatic. The literature on socialization and altruism 
confirms Aristotle's views by showing that when the home and the 
classroom are structured to give the child practice in prosocial behav- 
ior, such behavior becomes much more likely. 
If practice at being good is a good thing, it seems natural to do 
whatever one can to encourage children to practice. This has led some 
investigators to study the effects of reward for prosocial behavior. 
Because rewards can be used effectively in general to strengthen de- 
sired behavior, it seems only natural to use them to encourage coopera- 
tion or altruism. It seems especially natural if one believes that such 
behavior occurs only when it serves the interests of the actor. A system 
of rewards for prosocial behavior can be seen as assuring that it will 
be in the individual's interests to be good. 
The results of such studies paint a coherent picture. When rewards 
are contingent on various forms of prosocial behavior, they increase 
the frequency of the behavior-as long as the rewards continue to be 
present. If the rewards are withdrawn, the prosocial behavior de- 
creases. Thus, unless one expects contingent rewards for prosocial 
behavior to be a permanent and ubiquitous part of the social scene, one 
cannot rely on them to be the primary source of prosocial behavior. We 
can understand such results from the framework provided by attribu- 
tion theory.5o Imagine a child who helps a playmate in distress. The 
child might seek to explain his or her helping behavior-to make a 
causal attribution. If no rewards are present, likely causal attributions 
would involve the state of distress of the victim, the understanding 
that helping is the right thing to do, and other explanations that focus 
on factors intrinsic to the act of helping. But the presence of revards 
offers an alternative, and apparently dominant, causal candidate. "I 
did it for the reward," the child might say to him- or herself. With 
that understanding of his or her motivation, it would come as no 
surprise if altruistic acts were not forthcoming when rewards were not 
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available. This is just a particular class of a much more general and 
well-documented phenomenon-the undermining of intrinsic motiva- 
tion by extrinsic rewards.51 
For example, in one study, second and third graders who were given 
rewards for helping were less likely to explain their own behavior in 
terms of intrinsic motivation to help than were children who did not 
receive rewards.52 In another study, children were praised (social re- 
ward) or merely told that they were helpful people for making dona- 
tions to another. Only in the latter case was the likelihood of donation 
high in a subsequent follow-up study.53 In another study of elementary 
school children, it was found that their mothers' tendency to use re- 
wards as socialization tools was negatively correlated with the likeli- 
hood that the children would help when unobserved in free-play set- 
tings.54 Results similar to these have been obtained with adult subjects. 
The presence of extrinsic rewards decreased their perception of them- 
selves as altruistic and decreased the likelihood that they would help 
again at a later time without rewards. Conversely, experimenter inter- 
ventions that focused on the altruistic nature of the subjects increased 
the likelihood of future altruistic behavior.55 
The literature on the use of rewards to promote altruism should 
remind the reader of where this article began. It began with a set 
of presumptions that, taken together, made genuine altruism seem 
impossible. Because of the inherently atomistic, self-interested charac- 
ter of human nature, there simply had to be something in it for the 
altruist. Not only that, but that "something" that served self-interest 
had to be the cause of the altruistic act. In other words, it would not 
do to suggest that although altruists get satisfaction from their altruis- 
tic acts, that is not the reason they do them-that they do them because 
they are the right things to do, and the satisfaction is a bonus. From 
within the presumptions of atomism and egoism, such an account is 
naive at best. The actors themselves may believe that their acts are 
motivated by obligation, responsibility, and commitment, but what 
really keeps them going is some kind of direct payoff. Thinking like 
this makes it perfectly natural to use extrinsic rewards to beef up the 
payoff for altruistic acts; extrinsic rewards are seen as making only a 
quantitative change in the incentive structure of a situation, not a 
qualitative one. 
When theorists who hold the view that genuine altruism is impossi- 
ble are presented with examples of altruism, they try to explain them 
by appealing to one or another mechanism of self-interest. Appeals 
to kin selection and inclusive fitness are the way sociobiology handles 
altruism toward offspring or other genetic relatives. Reciprocal altru- 
ism is one way sociobiologists (and other social scientists) handle the 
fact that altruism is much more likely among people who know one 
another or who are alike in some significant way. The rewarding power 
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of praise and social approval is another way such acts of altruism are 
handled. And when empathy (or sympathy) is introduced as an essen- 
tial ingredient of altruistic behavior, the atomists suggest that the 
altruist acts only to relieve the distress that is created by his or her 
empathy. 
In principle, one could test these various self-interest-based alterna- 
tives to genuine altruism by creating experimental situations in which 
genuinely altruistic motives and self-interested motives will push peo- 
ple to behave differently. Batson and his associates have been doing 
precisely this for the last several years.56 Thus, for example, Batson 
has provided evidence that empathy and personal distress at the plight 
of another are actually distinct and essentially independent affective 
states. This finding makes the claim that empathy-based altruism is 
really motivated by the relief of personal distress more difficult to 
sustain. He has also shown that the mood of altruistic actors is affected 
by whether or not the victim actually gains relief from his or her 
unfortunate situation and not by whether they happen to have been 
the agents responsible for that relief. This finding makes the claim 
that altruism is really only the pursuit of social approval and status 
more difficult to sustain. 
Although careful, analytic experiments can be done to test particular 
egoistic explanations of altruistic behavior, there seems to be an endless 
supply of such explanations. Egoistic accounts of altruism will continue 
to sprout, like weeds, and investigators will face the task of evaluating 
and rejecting them, one by one, indefinitely unless the ground can be 
replowed and some of the presumptions that dominate the human 
sciences be replaced. I turn to an examination of this possibility next. 
On the Different Modes of Social Relations 
A likely reason why the presumptions of modern social science-indi- 
vidualism, atomism, and egoism-have been so pervasively and uncrit- 
ically embraced is that they conjure up a picture of human beings and 
social life that is very much like the life that most people live in modern, 
Western societies. The ideology of the marketplace exhorts people to 
pursue their own interests and trust in the system to take care of 
social welfare in general. The ideology of rights protects people, as 
autonomous individuals, from having to submit to the will of the ma- 
jority. And much of the ideology explicit or implicit in pop psychology 
encourages people to aspire to autonomy and independence-to find 
out, and to do, what is right for them and not worry so much about 
the consequences for others. The extent to which modern life has 
actually been influenced by the individualist presumptions of the social 
sciences, as opposed to just influencing them, is an interesting ques- 
tion, best left for another place. For now, it is sufficient to note that 
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a Western social scientist who casually observes the character of the 
lives that surround him or her would have little reason even to inves- 
tigate these individualist presumptions, let alone cast about for an 
alternative. 
A way out of this myopia is through cross-cultural investigation, 
and there is of course a long history of cross-cultural research in 
the social sciences. But there is no guarantee that a cross-cultural 
perspective will eliminate the bedrock presumption that the many and 
varied cultural proscriptions and prescriptions one observes are simply 
laid on top of a human nature that is universal. It is possible to argue, 
in other words, that although different cultures may induce people 
to behave more altruistically than our culture does, such cultures are 
only papering over basic human nature more than we do. 
Although this view may never have been extremely plausible, it was 
certainly extremely popular, at least among psychologists who took 
as their task the discovery of the universals of human nature. The 
emergence of a new subdiscipline in the social sciences-some call it 
"cultural psychology"-has challenged this view by suggesting that 
the effects of culture do not merely paper over the human nature 
that lies underneath, but instead penetrate all the way down, affecting 
not only what people take to be self-interest, and what they will do to 
serve self-interest, but even what they take to be a self.57 For example, 
Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama have recently shown that the 
boundaries that separate the self from others are very much culture- 
specific.58 In cultures like that of the United States, the self is construed 
as an independent entity. Independence, autonomy, and "self-actualiza- 
tion" are prized, and the values and preferences of each individual 
are given a status independent of the values and preferences of others. 
The individualist presumptions of social science are tailor-made for a 
self like this. In other cultures, even industrial cultures like Japan, the 
self is construed as an interdependent entity. Significant others form 
a part of the self, and their values and preferences are, in significant 
respects, one's own. The Japanese term sunao, used to label a trait 
that parents nurture and value in their children, "assumes cooperation 
to be an act of affirmation of the self."" In cultures like this, people 
are not faced with the choice between self-interest and altruism, at 
least not in the way that Americans face it. Also, the need to explain 
away altruism evaporates as the distinction between doing something 
because it makes you feel better and doing it because it makes the 
other feel better blurs. If the other is part of you, then acts of altruism 
become simultaneously impossible and ubiquitous. They become im- 
possible because "devotion to the interests of others" is not "opposed 
to egoism," and they become ubiquitous because devotion to the inter- 
ests of others is a part of everyone's everyday life. In cultures like this, 
many of the conflicts Americans routinely face between doing the 
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right thing and doing the self-interested thing also evaporate. No 
doubt they are replaced by different conflicts, but these different con- 
flicts will be reflections of fundamentally different selves, with funda- 
mentally different notions of value and of self-interest. 
Markus and Kitayama discuss several essential differences between 
the independent self and the interdependent self, many of which have 
implications for the study of altruism. For the independent self, rela- 
tions with others are typically means to individual ends. This is what 
opens up all acts of altruism to egoistic interpretation. In contrast, to 
the interdependent self, relations with others are ends in themselves. 
The key properties of the independent self are internal and private- 
such psychological entities as abilities, thoughts, and feelings. In con- 
trast, the key properties of the interdependent self are public-such 
social entities as roles, status, and social relations. The key tasks for 
the independent self are to be unique, to express oneself, and to pursue 
one's personal goals. The key tasks of the interdependent self are to 
belong, to fit in, to occupy one's proper place, and to promote the 
goals of others. Success for the independent self comes from self- 
expression and self-realization, whereas for the interdependent self, it 
comes from self-restraint and adjustment to the demands of social 
harmony. It may seem that adopting an interdependent construal of 
the self means giving up the desire for agency and for achievement. 
But Markus and Kitayama point out that it need not mean either. 
Agency (control) and achievement may be seen as extremely important 
and valuable-in the service, however, of group, rather than individ- 
ual, goals. 
It should be obvious that in a culture characterized by an interdepen- 
dent construal of the self, acts of altruism become so unremarkable 
that they almost disappear as a category that is distinct from self- 
interested acts. Attempts to distinguish selfish from unselfish motives 
for prosocial acts become almost nonsensical. Research like this opens 
up the presumptions of modern social science to careful inspection by 
showing just how culturally specific they are. It also begs for research- 
ers to evaluate the extent to which cultural influences on prosocial 
behavior dominate the more individual influences that psychologists 
are much more accustomed to searching for. 
Markus and Kitayama establish a sharp contrast between extreme 
individualism, on the one hand, and extreme "communitarianism," on 
the other, and it is possible that one can find cultures in which people 
live at one or the other extreme in all domains of their lives. What 
seems more plausible, however, even in extremely individualist cul- 
tures like ours, is that the same individual lives by different rules in 
different domains, that the same individual can be (appropriately) 
more or less individualistic depending on the setting in which actions 
must be chosen. Alan Fiske has recently fleshed out this possibility by 
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suggesting that there are four fundamentally different rule systems 
that capture virtually all the forms of social interaction one observes 
in all cultures.60 What distinguishes cultures from one another is the 
domains in which each of these rule systems operates. Some of these 
rule systems are likely to encourage interdependent selves, and others, 
independent selves. Thus, the kind of self one has may depend on 
which of these rule systems is dominant in one's culture. 
Fiske refers to the four rule systems as communal sharing, authority 
ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. The communal sharing 
rule system makes a fundamental distinction between us and them, 
that is, between members and nonmembers of the community. All 
individuals within the community are regarded as equivalent to one 
another and as distinct from all those outside the community. In a 
communal sharing relation, people treat material objects as things 
that all members of the group hold in common. People take what they 
need and contribute what they can, and no one keeps score. In cultures 
that are dominated by communal-sharing relations, land tends to be 
freely available for use by anyone who needs it, work tends to be done 
collectively, and the products of the work are freely available. Decisions 
tend to be made by consensus. In cultures like ours, where communal 
sharing is not the dominant form of social life, it nevertheless is com- 
mon in some domains, like the family. For many, a significant goal is 
to have communal sharing relations extend outside the family to larger 
units of the social world-to friends, to neighbors, to people of the 
same faith, or with the same ethical commitments. Within members 
of the group-however the group is defined and however large it 
gets--actions are meant to be governed by an ethic of care and respon- 
sibility, and people are expected to treat one another with kindness 
(in both senses of the word; as Fiske points out, people are expected 
to treat members of their own kind with kindness). Within a social 
network run by principles of communal sharing, the boundaries be- 
tween self and other will be fuzzy, and thus, distinguishing between 
egoism and altruism will be difficult and perhaps pointless. People 
who grow up in cultures dominated by communal sharing seem to 
reason quite differently than do people in U.S. culture about which 
kinds of prosocial acts require justifications and which kinds of justifi- 
cations are appropriate.61 
Authority ranking, as the name implies, ranks people relative to 
one another. Some people are better than (higher than, more im- 
portant than) others. Social groups that run by authority-ranking rules 
ctend to be rather rigid, hierarchical, and authoritarian. People expect 
to be treated by (and to treat) others in ways that are entirely deter- 
mined by their relative positions in the rankings. The material goods 
they get, and what they have to do to get them, the respect and admira- 
tion they receive from others, and what they have to give others in 
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return all are determined by their relative social position. Although 
there are some cultures that are dominated by this form of social 
organization, U.S. culture obviously is not, although one sees it in the 
military, in industry, in some religious groups, in some families, and 
in other settings where there is a clear chain of command. In a domain 
ruled by authority ranking, who does what, who gets what, and how 
decisions are made will be very different than they are in a domain 
ruled by communal sharing. Altruistic behavior may again be hard to 
discern, not because the boundaries between self and other are fuzzy, 
but because the duties and obligations specified by one's social position 
may be so well detailed that altruism may never be required as a motive 
nor empathy as a triggering affect. 
Equality-matching rules of social interaction focus on equity, reciproc- 
ity, and fairness. In contrast to communal sharing, in which people give 
as they are able and take as they need, and in contrast to authority 
ranking, in which people give and take according to their established 
social positions, equality-matching systems turn on notions of fair com- 
pensation for effort and appropriate reciprocation for acts of kindness. In 
contrast to the marketplace, with which we are so familiar, the objective of 
exchange is not profit, but equity, and the mechanism of exchange is 
not contract, but trust. People take turns and try to give back what they 
get-neither more (for that might be either insulting or foolish) nor less 
(for that would be a moral violation). Thus, for example, when people 
reciprocate for dinner parties, their objective (if they are operating within 
the spirit of an equality-matching system) is to offer hospitality that will 
be essentially equivalent to what they received. Reciprocation that is too 
spartan or informal will insult their former hosts, whereas reciprocation 
that is too lavish will embarass them. Equity, not superiority, and match- 
ing, not profiting, are the goals. 
There are countless examples of equality-matching social relations 
across a wide range of cultures. People help their neighbors raise 
buildings or harvest crops and receive reciprocation at another time. 
People send one another Christmas cards and gifts. Senators and con- 
gresspeople vote for one another's pet legislation. Friends take turns 
baby-sitting for one another's children. In all such cases, the objective 
seems to be equality. In some instances, people go so far to insure 
equality that they give back exactly the same things that they have 
previously received.62 The point of such exchanges, Fiske suggests, is 
not material gain, but rather to cement the equality-matching relation 
itself. Indeed, there is evidence that people will reject exchanges in 
which they benefit over their partners and prefer exchanges that are 
equitable.63 In his very influential work on the nature of justice, John 
Rawls gives equality matching great prominence in suggesting that a 
system of equal distribution of wealth is what individuals would choose 
if they were forced to choose from behind a "veil of ignorance" that 
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concealed what their position would be when society was constructed 
and wealth was distributed.64 
Several studies of the development of reciprocity in children suggest 
that a sensitivity to equality-matching relations is present fairly early. 
Toddlers have been shown to share toys with one another based on 
whether the other toddler previously shared with them.65 In a study 
in which 3-5-year-old children had the opportunity to share food 
with friends or acquaintances, although there were few spontaneous 
offers to share, children usually responded positively to the requests 
of others. And in subsequent tests, children's willingness to share was 
very much dependent on how their requests for food had been treated 
previously.66 Finally, in another study, first graders evaluated acts of 
positive reciprocation more highly than acts of altruism, suggesting 
that for them, equity may be more highly valued than charity."' 
As in the case of communal sharing and authority ranking, it is 
difficult to know how to fit altruistic behavior into a social scheme run 
by equality-matching rules. If, indeed, equality matching is important 
to people precisely because it helps strengthen the relation of which 
it is a characteristic, then offering help to others can be understood 
as serving the self. This will be true so long as equality matching is a 
goal of a social relation. It does not follow from this, of course, that 
one's reasons for helping or sharing or giving actually are self-serving. 
It is just that in a system that is equity based, any actions that serve 
the needs of another will also serve the self, so long as all participants 
are playing by the same rules. What this implies is that the distinction 
between altruistic and egoistic is not especially helpful in an equality- 
matching context. 
The final social rule system discussed by Fiske, the one to which 
modern Americans are perhaps most accustomed, is the market-pric- 
ing system. Market pricing is what governs relations in the market, 
where it is understood that people are interested not in equity, but in 
gain, and where the principal lubricant of exchange is not trust, but 
contract. Market pricing is enormously facilitated by (perhaps even 
made possible by) a medium of exchange like money. Money makes 
it possible for people to engage in transactions anonymously and by 
long distance. As Fiske puts it, transactions need leave no traces be- 
cause they can be paid for there and then. There is no need to keep 
score and no need to expect explicit and direct reciprocation. The 
market as a system enables more indirect reciprocation. Buyers do not 
require that the people who sell to them turn around and buy from 
them. All that is required is that there be some (anonymous) buyers 
for every seller. Money also makes it possible to exchange things that 
seem incomparable to one another based on their intrinsic properties. 
So long as each thing can be given a dollar value, a price, then things 
that are intrinsically quite different can be regarded as equivalent if 
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they have the same price. This permits a kind of fluidity and freedom 
in social relations that the other types of social rules do not. For example, 
in an equality-matching framework, how does one go about deciding 
whether any reciprocation for a dinner invitation except a return dinner 
invitation is equitable? Because the value of such social acts is not just 
their price-indeed, may be totally unrelated to their price-the only 
way to assure equity is to reciprocate in kind. With market pricing and 
a medium of exchange, this is no longer necessary. Value is price, every- 
thing has a price, and everything can be exchanged. 
It is the market-pricing system of social relations to which the indi- 
vidualist, egoist presumptions of social science seem especially well 
suited. This may not be an inevitable characteristic of market-pricing 
social rules. However, because the institution that embodies those 
rules-the market-is based on the presumption that the only point 
of exchange is profit, it is quite likely that self-interest will appear to 
rule. Furthermore, in addition to being guided by the ideology of 
self-interest, market exchange makes possible transactions between 
anonymous agents, thereby decreasing the chances that any agent will 
even know the interests of the people with whom he or she interacts, 
let alone cater to them. Thus, people are not expected or supposed 
to be altruistic in market transactions, and if they nevertheless want 
to be, they probably will not know how to do it. 
It is hardly surprising that if the market relations are taken as the 
model for social relations, investigators will be extremely suspicious of 
apparent acts of altruism and will be on the lookout for the selfish 
interests that are "actually" being served. That is, a certain amount of 
tunnel vision will have been created by the investigators' theoretical 
presumptions. But there is more going on than mere theory-guided, 
selective perception of the world. If people actually live in a world 
that is dominated by market relations, it becomes much less likely that 
they will engage in genuine acts of altruism. There are some data that 
suggest that even though people are not, in general, inclined to act 
egoistically, they will do so when they think they are being exploited. 
And the marketplace, in explicitly sanctioning the unbridled pursuit 
of self-interest (and the caveat emptor that accompanies it), permits 
and even encourages exploitation. So in a society dominated by market 
pricing, people may be utterly egoistic-in self-defense. The combina- 
.tion of a social science that is prepared to see only egoism and social 
institutions that are prepared to foster only egoism virtually guaran- 
tees that egoism is all that the society will get. 
Changing Social Structures and Changing Social Values 
The critical idea suggested in the work of Fiske and of Markus and 
Kitayama is that the frequency of behavior that we might regard as 
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altruistic is likely to depend more on the social structures within which 
people live than on any essential and universal characteristics of hu- 
man nature. If people live in societies in which the boundaries between 
self and other are not sharp, and the rules of social interaction empha- 
size sharing or equity, they will behave quite differently from those 
in societies that make clear distinctions between self and other and 
emphasize the pursuit of self-interest. Said another way, egoists are 
made, not born. The devotion to self-interest is not a "natural" part 
of human nature, but it can be a part of human nature under the 
right conditions. To see the egoist in full flower, one needs a society 
organized around an unfettered market, from which social institutions 
that might restrict exchange have been systematically eliminated. The 
market-pricing system is not made possible by egoists; rather, it makes 
egoists possible. The implications of this idea for an account of social 
behavior are significant. Remember, in the eyes of social science, the 
presumptions of individualism, atomism, and egoism are not mere 
descriptions of particular points and places in history and culture. They 
are scientific laws, fundamental truths about the human organism and 
the human condition. One way of thinking about laws in general is as 
constraints on human activities. The law of gravity is one such con- 
straint; it keeps people from flying about uncontrollably. The law that 
prohibits going through red lights is another such constraint; it keeps 
people from driving their cars in whatever way they like. But these two 
kinds of "laws" are obviously very different. The constraint imposed by 
gravity is not human made, not self-imposed, and it cannot be repealed 
no matter how much people want to repeal it. The constraint on going 
through red lights, in contrast, is self-imposed and easily repealed. 
Which of these kinds of constraints are the individualism, atomism, 
and egoism of social science? The implication of Fiske and of Markus 
and Kitayama is that they are clearly like traffic laws, not gravity. 
All the features of society that make egoism ring true are human 
creations-creations that could be different, that indeed are different 
in different cultures, and may once have been different in our own.68 
One could imagine society moving in the future in directions that 
undercut some of the conditions on which egoism depends. One could 
also imagine society moving in directions that permit the extension of 
egoism to aspects of human life, like marriage and child rearing, that 
they presently do not pervade. But either of these moves, should they 
develop, will be the product of human discretion, not of natural 
necessity. 
If the laws of egoism are like traffic laws rather than laws of gravity, 
they are in need of justification or defense. Gravity requires no de- 
fense; it simply is. Not so for traffic laws. We must defend the infringe- 
ment on individual freedom they represent. It must be argued that 
this set of traffic laws, and not some other, is the right one. Such a 
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defense may not be difficult to make, but it will appeal to such things 
as values and morals; it will depend on some understanding of what 
is good for people and what is good for society. The rules of market 
pricing can be defended in the same way. People can attempt to justify 
them by appealing to human rights, freedoms, and entitlements. Peo- 
ple can attempt to justify them by appealing to the goods, both social 
and individual, that will derive from a market-pricing social system. 
That is to say, market pricing and egoism can be defended-or at- 
tacked-on moral grounds. But they cannot be defended as just an- 
other gravitational constraint on human activity. 
In order for moral discourse about the logic of egoism, or of markets, 
to make any sense, people must be able to see that there are alterna- 
tives. Otherwise, moral discourse becomes idle drawing room conver- 
sation. In a society in which the market operates only in limited spheres 
of life, and other expectations, standards, and rules operate in other 
spheres, these other standards provide the concrete alternatives to the 
market that make moral discourse worthwhile. People can argue about 
whether this or that domain of life should run according to market 
principles or some other principles. In this connection, it has been 
suggested by several writers that late twentieth-century industrial soci- 
eties are witnessing a spread of economic thinking to previously non- 
economic domains.69 This "economic imperialism" has applied the 
logic of rational choice to family life, to education, to the law, and to 
political activity. Each time the scope of the market extends itself, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for people to envision an alternative to 
the logic of egoism. As a result, atomism and egoism become the only 
game in town; they become "laws of nature" by default. 
I can illustrate the way in which economic imperialism threatens to 
subsume all other domains of life and the pursuit of different goals 
that these domains make possible by focusing on a study done by 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler.70 The study 
concerned people's judgments of fairness over a range of different 
hypothetical economic situations. Each of the situations was described, 
and people were asked to assess whether the behavior in question in 
each situation was fair or unfair. For example: A hardware store has 
been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after a large snow- 
storm, the store raises the price to $20. Is this fair? 
A market-pricing answer to this question is that yes, of course it 
is fair to charge $20. More accurately, the market-pricing answer 
might be that "fairness" has nothing to do with it. The real question 
is, Is it profitable? And this question will have different answers in 
different circumstances. Now suppose one were operating from 
a non-market-pricing, or not purely market-pricing, perspective. 
Suppose that fairness implied a certain responsibility to meet the 
needs of the community and to honor the loyalty of one's regular 
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customers. Suppose that fairness appealed to some moral principle 
that said one was entitled to a reasonable profit, but not to whatever 
the traffic would bear. From within this perspective, one might well 
decide that it was unfair to charge $20 for the shovel, even if one 
could get away with it. 
In the study, 82 pecent of the respondents judged the $20 price to 
be unfair, suggesting that the majority of people do not make decisions 
of this kind from within a purely market-pricing perspective. 
Here is another example, a question with two variants: 
A small photocopying shop has one employee who has worked in the shop 
for 6 months and earns $9 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, 
but a factory in the area has recently closed and unemployment has increased. 
Other small shops have now hired reliable workers at $7 per hour to perform 
jobs similar to those done by the photocopy shop employee. The owner of the 
photocopying shop reduces the employee's wage to $7 per hour. Is this fair? 
A small photocopying shop has one employee who has worked in the shop 
for 6 months and earns $9 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, 
but a factory in the area has recently closed and unemployment has increased. 
Other small shops have now hired reliable workers at $7 per hour to perform 
jobs similar to those done by the photocopy shop employee. The current 
employee leaves, and the owner of the photocopying shop decides to pay a 
replacement $7 per hour. Is this fair? 
Do these two questions evoke the same evaluation? From a purely 
economic perspective, the situations are equivalent. Bosses pay the 
lowest wage they can get away with. A supply of surplus labor enables 
them to lower the wages of current employees or replace them with 
unemployed people who will accept the lower wage. However, 83 
percent of the respondents thought the first situation was unfair. This 
is not because they believed that working in a photocopying shop was 
simply worth $9 per hour, because 73 percent of the respondents 
thought the second situation was fair. More likely, what was guiding 
people's judgments was a sense that a "fair wage" was determined by 
many things. One was the profit margin of the employer. Another 
was what the going wage was for similar work in the area. But a third 
was the wage history of the particular employees involved. That a 
person was earning $9 per hour made that his "reference wage." 
Barring real economic hardships on the part of the employer, the 
reference wage could not fairly be reduced. It could certainly not be 
reduced just because other people out there were willing to work for 
a lower wage. That the reference wage was attached to the employee 
and not the job is clear from people's willingness to pay a lower wage 
for the same job if it went to a new employee. 
It should not be concluded that the respondents in this study were 
antiboss or anticapitalist. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that it 
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was fair to increase prices or decrease wages if profits were being 
threatened, especially if the threat to profits came from circumstances 
outside the employer's control. In fact, respondents treated increases 
in profit as fair if they were the result not of increased prices or 
decreased wages but instead of a cheaper source of raw materials or 
a more efficient production process. In other words, producers and 
retailers were not required to pass their savings on to purchasers. 
What people's responses to these examples point to is that the aver- 
age person seems to think it is perfectly appropriate to apply moral 
standards in evaluating economic transactions. The market is not an 
amoral playing field in which anything that is legal is acceptable. The 
market is not a place in which the naked and unrestrained pursuit of 
self-interest is condoned. People may have come to expect the worst 
in the market, but they have not yet come to accept it. Instead of 
allowing economic considerations to encroach on the moral domain, 
the respondents in this study seem to insist that moral considerations- 
in this case, fairness-should encroach on the economic domain. 
If people are willing to impose standards of fairness in the market- 
place, as the respondents in this study clearly were, then perhaps my 
concern about economic imperialism is an idle one. Perhaps, but I do 
not think so. Standards of fairness must originate somewhere, and 
because there is no place for fairness within the domain of the market 
(and its accompanying market-pricing ideology), these standards must 
be developed in other domains. It seems likely that they are developed, 
encouraged, and sustained in various nonmarket institutions like the 
family, the local community, the school, and the church. These stan- 
dards are then imported, at least by some people, into market situa- 
tions. So long as these nonmarket institutions retain their noneco- 
nomic character and purpose, concern for fairness can continue to be 
nurtured. But if they are invaded by economic considerations, the 
nurturing of concern for fairness will surely weaken. The fact that 
the respondents in this study showed concern for fairness may show 
only that the nonmarket institutions that helped shape them had not 
yet been deeply penetrated by economic considerations. However, 
this offers no guarantees for the future. People possess no built-in 
safeguards against the erosion of concern for fairness. There is noth- 
ing natural, automatic, or inevitable about this concern. It must be 
learned, and it must be taught. And other things can be taught quite 
easily in its place. Many of the questions about fairness just reviewed 
were asked to a group of MBA students at a prestigious business 
school. In general, their fairness judgments were quite different from 
the judgments of the respondents in the original study. In general, 
their judgments were that efforts to maximize profit were fair. All's 
fair-from increasing prices to decreasing wages-in the market."71 
Had the students learned this in their MBA program, or did they seek 
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MBAs because they already believed it? Whichever of these possibili- 
ties is true, it should make clear to us that there is no reason to count 
on the concern for fairness as an ineluctable part of our approach to 
social life. 
Conclusion: The Fragility of Altruism 
Amartya Sen has argued that there is a source of concern for fairness 
that the logic of egoism cannot encompass, indeed, that sometimes 
leads to actions in direct violation of the logic of egoism.72 He calls 
this source of concern "commitment" and suggests that it cannot be 
incorporated within the atomistic, egoistic framework. To act out of 
commitment is to do what one thinks is right, what will promote the 
public welfare, quite apart from whether it promotes one's own. It is 
to act out of a sense of responsibility as a citizen. Acts of commitment 
include voting in large, general elections. They include doing one's 
job to the best of one's ability--going beyond the terms of the contract, 
even if no one is watching and there is nothing to be gained from it. 
They include refusing to charge what the traffic will bear for necessities 
during times of shortage, refusing to capitalize on fortuitous circum- 
stances at the expense of others. 
Acts of commitment like these occur routinely. They are what holds 
society together. But they are a problem for the logic of egoism. As 
Sen says, "Commitment drives a wedge between personal choice 
and personal welfare, and much of traditional economic theory relies 
on the identity of the two." He continues: 
The economic theory of utility is sometimes criticized for having too 
much structure; human beings are alleged to be "simpler" in reality pre- 
cisely the opposite seems to be the case: traditional theory has too little struc- 
ture. A person is given one preference ordering, and as and when the need 
arises, this is supposed to reflect his interests, represent his welfare, summarize 
his idea of what should be done, and describe his actual choices and behavior. 
Can one preference ordering do all these things? A person thus described 
may be "rational" in the limited sense of revealing no inconsistencies in his 
choice behavior, but if he has no use for this distinction between quite different 
concepts, he must be a bit of a fool. The purely economic man is indeed close 
to being a social moron.73 
The existence of commitment casts the egoistic presumptions of 
social science in a whole new light. True, when making economic 
decisions, people will presumably choose that alternative that maxi- 
mizes self-interest. But before they can do this, they have to make 
another choice. They have to choose to make an economic decision 
that is based on self-interest as against, say, a moral one that is based 
on commitment. In addition to having a set of preferences among 
commodities, people must be understood to have a set of preferences 
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among their interests. Preferring one preference hierarchy over an- 
other amounts to preferring to be one kind of person over another, 
preferring to have one kind of character over another. Any thorough 
analysis of the logic of egoism must include an account of how people 
choose their preferences and how culture contributes to the set of 
preferences among which people choose. Much of modern social sci- 
ence takes this most fundamental aspect of human preference and 
choice as a given. 
Fiske points out that most societies are heterogeneous in the rule 
systems they apply to the regulation of social life, although one may 
be more dominant than the others. In our own society, despite the 
dominance of market pricing, virtually all people have social relations 
guided by each type of rule. Indeed, one's relations with the same 
person may follow one rule system in one domain and a different rule 
system in another. Imagine two friends who share completely and 
indiscriminately their science fiction novels (communal sharing) and 
at the same time work at a task (patching and painting an apartment) 
in which one is the expert ordering the other around (authority rank- 
ing), who divide precisely their expenses and driving time for a cross- 
country vacation (equality matching), and agree for one to buy the 
other's old car at the going market price. It may be that what we 
identify as essentially unlimited personal freedom in modern America 
is, in part, the freedom to apply whichever rule system we like to 
whatever domains of life we like, subject only to the agreement of the 
people with whom we will be interacting. If this is true, then, in effect, 
each of us has the power to decide whether to have an independent 
self or an interdependent one, whether to live by the rules of the 
market or to live by the rules of community, whether to obviate altru- 
ism by connecting our interests to the interests of others, or to obviate 
it by creating a system in which only the egoists can survive. 
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